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that in requiring operators to keep within the bounds of lawful use
and due care, the utility of their acts is not allowed to "com-
pletely dominate the situation," but on the contrary, a uniform
and stable test for redressable injury is preserved.
Eldon R. Vaughan.
COMMISSIONER V. CULBERTSON-AN ANALYSIS OF
THE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP PROBLEMO N a ranch near Dalhart, Texas, some ten years ago, R. S.
Coon forged the first link in a chain of circumstances which
ultimately led to a reanalysis by the Supreme Court of the United
State of the troublesome problem of taxation of family partner-
ships.
Almost from the moment of the Supreme Court's decision in
the earlier leading family partnership cases of Tower' and
Lusthaus,2 there has been a great deal of discussion as to their
intended meaning. The Tower and Lusthaus cases involved the fa-
miliar type situation in which a husband, finding himself in a
high surtax bracket, made a gift to his wife of an interest in his
business. In each case, the husband and wife thereafter formed a
partnership, the wife contributing the capital which her husband
had given her, but not contributing either vital services or capital
originating with her, and not taking part in the management or
control of the business. In each case the Supreme Court looked
through the form of the transactions, viewed the substance, ascer-
tained that the husband had, directly or indirectly, given his wife
that which she contributed to the business for the purpose of
reducing his income taxes, and ruled that the total income from
the business was taxable to the husband.
1 Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946).
2 Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U. S. 293 (1946).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
With those decisions already of record, the case of Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue v. W. 0. Culbertson, Sr.,' came, by
writ of certiorari, before the Court. The taxpayer had been, up
until October, 1939, in the cattle business, operating as a partner
with R. S. Coon. Coon, 79 years of age and in ill health, wanted
to terminate the partnership, and agreed to sell out to Culbertson
if the latter would sell an undivided one-half interest in the part-
nership interests to his, Culbertson's, four sons. Coon wanted
Culbertson to take the sons into the business because of his desire
to see their registered hereford strain maintained and because of
Culbertson's advanced age. Culbertson bought Coon's interest for
$99,440.00, subject to the foregoing qualification and two days
later sold an undivided one-half interest to the four boys. The
boys gave their father a note for $49,270.00, bearing 4% inter-
est, and due to mature one year from date as payment for their
interest. That note was later replaced by one for $57,674 to cover
the acquisition of additional property owned by the old partner-
ship. The partnership agreement was oral, but was reported in
the local papers, and a bank account on which Culbertson, the
four boys, and a bookkeeper could check, was opened. The oldest
son was 24 years old, lived on the ranch, had been foreman under
the old partnership, and received $100.00 per month, board, and
lodging for himself and his wife under the old partnership and
the new, until he went to the Army. The second son, 22, finished
college and went into the Army in 1940, the first year of the new
partnership's operations. The two younger sons, 18 and 16 years
of age, attended school during the winter and worked on the
ranch during the summer. The tax years in question were 1940
and 1941. A partnership return was filed for both years, indicat-
ing a division of income approximating the capital attributed to
each partner.
The Commissioner and Tax Court disallowed the division of
income on the ground that a valid partnership did not exist. The
. 337 U. S. 733 (1949).
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Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Upon claim being
made by the Commissioner that the principles of the Tower and
Lusthaus cases had been departed from in the Court of Appeals
decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court's deci-
sion, reversing and remanding, was announced on June 27, 1949.
From its decision in the Culbertson case, it was apparent that
the Tax Court interpreted the Tower and Lusthaus opinions to
mean that the correct manner in which to handle family partner-
ship cases was to apply to the particular facts the mechanical tests
of (1) contribution of original capital and (2) contribution of
vital services. "Partners" who failed to meet one or both of these
tests, thought the Tax Court, could not bear a part of the tax inci-
dence in the "partnership."
The Tax Court was not alone in its opinion that the Supreme
Court, particularly in the Tower case, had laid down a more or
less rigid test for the determination of the validity of such a part-
nership arrangement. Other writers share that opinion, one, for
example, having this to say:
"Under these decisions the rule is that a partnership among family
members is not recognized for income tax purposes unless the mem-
bers meet the test of actual participation in the business. This may
be either through the investment of new capital or performance of
services related to management and control of the business or the
rendering of vital services."'
The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court's decision in the
Culbertson case, using as its basis the belief that the correct inter-
pretation of the Tower and Lusthaus opinions would permit the
use of the test of "future intent" on the part of the sons to become
full, active partners in determining whether or not, for tax pur-
poses, there was an actual partnership.' Applying that test, the
Circuit Court held that the sons were partners.
' Editorial Opinion, 5 P-H Fm. TAx Szav., § 72,012 (1949).
5 "Neither statute, common sense, nor impelling precedent requires the holding that
a partner must contribute capital or render services to the partnership prior to the time
that he is taken into it. These tests are equally effective whether the capital and the
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The Supreme Court severely criticized the Tax Court's inter-
pretation of the Tower and Lusthaus opinions. Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson, author of the majority opinion, quickly found fault with
the mechanical tests applied by the Tax Court, and stated that
whether or not a particular partnership is such for federal income
tax purposes is a question of present intent. The Court felt that
the question was not so much one of contribution of original cap-
ital or vital services, but rather, whether or not the parties intended
to join together in good faith and with a business purpose in the
present conduct of the partnership enterprise. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, in a concurring opinion, said he thought the Tax Court
failed to read and understand the Tower and Lusthaus opinions
in their entirety. He said the Tax Court had culled phrases from
the opinions in the Tower and Lusthaus cases which led to a mis-
conception of the principles enunciated therein when read out of
context.
The Court found fault, also, with the Circuit Court opinion.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's opinion rejected the view that a future
intent to provide valuable services would suffice to establish a
valid partnership under income tax law. He said that such an
intent could not meet the requirements of Sections 11 and 22(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code that he who presently earns income
through his own labor and skill and utilization of his own capital
must be taxed therefor.'
services are presently contributed and rendered or are later to be contributed or to be
rendered. Moreover, a partnership is formed to act in the future and not in the past and
when it is fully expected, intended, and agreed that the incoming partner will render
services to the partnership, the Government should not be heard to say: 'I will not rec-
ognize you as a partner even though you in good faith entered into it. I took you into
the Army to fight a war and you did not perform services for the partnership as you
had agreed to do.' " Culbertson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 168 F. (2d) 979
(1948).
6 "If it is conceded that some of the partners contributed neither capital nor services
to the partnership during the tax years in question, as the Court of Appeals was appar-
ently willing-to do in the present case, it can hardly be contended that they are in any
way responsible for the production of income during those years. Of course, one who has
been a bona fide partner does not lose that status when he is called into military or gov-
ernment service, and the Commissioner has not so contended. On the other hand, one
hardly becomes a partner in the conventional sense merely because he might have done
so had he not been called.... The intent to provide money, goods, labor or skill some
19491
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It was apparent throughout its opinion that the Court found
both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals decisions to be too
limited in scope. Each decision had in its own way made a mechan-
ical process of the determination of the partnership's validity.
The Tax Court had considered the present contribution of capital
and services to the exclusion of intent, present and future, while
the Court of Appeals had ignored the important aspects of pres-
ent intent, present contribution of capital, and present vital serv-
ices.
It is apparent that the Supreme Court, in its opinion, attempted
to lay down a broad basis upon which future triers of the facts
can determine whether or not, in a given case, a valid family part-
nership exists which will legally disperse the incidence of taxa-
tion of the income of the particular enterprise. The Court set out,
as a test to be followed by the Tax Court in its subsequent hearing
of this and other cases, the collective consideration of all the facts
-the agreement, the conduct of the parties in execution of its
provisions, their statements, the testimony of disinterested persons,
the relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and cap-
ital contrbutions, the actual control of income, and the purposes
for which it is used, and any other facts throwing light on their
true intent, and whether the parties in good faith and acting with a
business purpose intended to join together in the present conduct
of the enterprise!
In the future, if the Tax Court states in its opinions that it has
taken into consideration all of the criteria recommended by the
Supreme Court for the determination of the validity of these fam-
ily partnership agreements, and if there be substantial evidence
available to support the findings of the Tax Court, then the taxabil-
ity of all family partnerships will be finally settled at the trial
time in the future cannot meet the demands of Sections 11 and 22(a) of the Code that he
who presently earns the income through his own labor and skill and the utilization of
his own capital be taxed therefor. The vagaries of human experience preclude reliance
upon even good faith intent as to future conduct as a basis for the present taxation of
income." 337 U. S. 733, 738.
7 Id. at 742.
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